A Cascade of Errors (1517-2017)
On this day, October 31, 2017, it is pleasing for me to post on the Internet this Thesis that tries to outline the cascade of errors that—inadvertently—flowed from Martin Luther’s 95 Theses, which are believed to have been affixed onto the door of the Cathedral at Wittenberg on this very day 500 years ago.
Luther’s rejection of external authority and the Catholic Church’s unwillingness/inability to answer each one of those Theses in order to (re-)establish the foundation of her moral authority eventually resulted in the separation of man’s and women’s action from morality.
These are the errors that flow from the implicit Declaration of Freedom of Conscience:
1. The conscience becomes unmoored from the virtues;
2. Hence, freedom is no longer moral freedom, but becomes political freedom;
3. Political freedom is granted by other people’s will: the will of the King in a monarchy; the will of the majority in a democracy;
4. As Shakespeare knew, freedom of conscience leads to a tortured conscience: “to be or not to be”;
5. The elimination of doubt is resolved by the assumption that the mind is the fount of all certitude;
6. This lead to Descartes’ affirmation of “I think, therefore I am”;
7. Which led to the separation of the mind from the body—and soul;
8. Which led to rejection of God in human affairs; see David Hume et all:
9. Since “I” am, who needs anyone or anything else?
10. This error actually started with St. Thomas Aquinas, who believed that “all that exists is;”
11. This is an error of philosophical proportions, because only Being is—everything else Exists, and exists only in relation to Being;
12. The separation of mind from body and soul made room for Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), in which morality becomes—explicitly—an expression of our fickle feelings:
13. In time, Freud came along;
14. In time, Hugh Hefner came along;
15. Smith’s theory of moral sentiments has had so much sway, not because it borders on empty sentimentality, but because it is the result of a highly sophisticated interaction of elevated feelings and opinions;
16. Smith’s construction of the autonomous conscience is crowned by the conception of the "impartial spectator";
17. But, who is the impartial spectator?
18. The theory of moral sentiments falls apart upon the discovery that the impartial spectator is lui meme, he himself;
19. Yet, Adam Smith gave intellectual permission to Jeremy Bentham to publish his Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789), which provided the foundation for “utility” and utilitarianism—especially in economics;(Note-Smith totally rejected any kind of utilitarianism and Bentham’s version of utilitarianism)
20. Even though the conception of the “util” was eventually discarded because no one ever measured a util, utilitarianism still has sway in economics;
21. For a good reason after all, because economics is based on money—and money is “the best labor-saving device” ever devised;
22. Economists have yet to discover this verity;
23. It is The Theory of Moral Sentiments, more than Smith’s Wealth of Nations (1776), that stands at the foundation of (moral) capitalism;(Note-Bentham’s utilitarianism is the foundation of moral capitalism)
24. Nowhere to be found in the Wealth of Nations is the doctrine of economic justice;(Note-Justice, without any modifier, is the major virtue that is required by Smith for society to progress)
25. And since Adam Smith is the father of modern economics, nowhere to be found in economics today is the doctrine of economic justice;(Note-Bentham’s Max utility is the foundation of modern economics)
26. Adam Smith was aided in the destruction of economic justice by John Locke, who, in his Two Treatises on Government (1689) diverted our attention from the doctrine of economic justice onto a similar looking, but incompatible, stunted search for the justice of property rights; (Note-Locke is an early utilitarian who built upon Hobbes,just as Bentham did)
27. Which gave rise to the antinomy of Karl Marx, who preached the “injustice” of property rights”;
28. Property rights can be justified only if based on economic justice;
29. The doctrine of economic justice ruled the world from Aristotle through Thomas Aquinas to John Locke;(Note-Locke is an early utilitarian)
30. Today we are ruled by the doctrine of social justice;
31. Trouble is, no one has ever defined or will ever define what social justice is;
32. So, we allow the few to assert their freedom to legally acquire as much wealth as they wish, unrestrained by any sense of morality;
33. And then we beg them to give us something to take care of the poor;
34. On which basis? On the basis of legal and moral extorsion;
36. My right is tied to my responsibility toward you; your right is based on your responsibility toward me:
37. We argue about our mutual responsibilities and we agree on the common good: your good and my good.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Carmine Gorga is president of The Somist Institute. The mission of the institute is to foster sensible moral leadership. He is a former Fulbright scholar and the recipient of a Council of Europe Scholarship for his dissertation on "The Political Thought of Louis D. Brandeis." By inserting Hoarding into Keynes’ model of the economic system and using age-old principles of logic and epistemology, in a book and a series of papers Dr. Gorga has transformed the linear world of economic theory into a relational discipline in which everything is related to everything else—internally as well as externally. He was assisted in this endeavor by many people, notably for 27 years by Professor Franco Modigliani, a Nobel laureate in economics at MIT. The resulting work, The Economic Process: An Instantaneous Non-Newtonian Picture, was published in 2002 and has been reissued in a third edition in 2016. For reviews, click here. During the last few years, Dr. Gorga has concentrated his attention on the requirements for the unification of economic theory, policy, and practice calling this unity Concordian economics. He is also integrating this work into political science, which he calls Somism, and culture in general, which he calls Relationalism.